Analytical Policy Design under Rational Expectations

DOI10.2307/1914305MaRDI QIDQ4724389zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Charles H. Whiteman

Publication date 1986

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1914305

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamefeedforward and feedback strategiesfrequency domainlinear rational expectations modelopen loop strategyoptimal policyprecommitment gamestime consistencyWiener-Hopf methodWold moving averagez-transformzero man, linearly regular covariance stationary stochastic process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• The design of feedback rules in linear stochastic rational expectations models
• Time consistency, subgame perfectness, solution concepts and information patterns in dynamic models of stabilization policies
• How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164515
• Design limits and dynamic policy analysis

Cited in

(10)

• Spectral utility, Wiener-Hopf techniques, and rational expectations
• Optimal policy with limited commitment
• Optimal policy in a model of endogenous fluctuations and assets
• A rational expectations critique of merger policy analysis
• Design limits and dynamic policy analysis
• A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3954137 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package
• Induction and the Ramsey policy
• Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information

This page was built for publication: Analytical Policy Design under Rational Expectations

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4724389)