How to Weight Scientists' Probabilities Is Not a Big Problem: Comment on Barnes

DOI10.1093/BJPS/50.2.283MaRDI QIDQ4527767zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul E. Meehl

Publication date 4 July 2001

Published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.2.283

zbMATH Keywords

philosophy of science

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Foundations of classical theories (including reverse mathematics) (03B30) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

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