Incentives and efficiency in uncertain collaborative environments

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_4MaRDI QIDQ2937744zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnovic

Publication date 12 January 2015

Published in Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.0990

zbMATH Keywords

collaborative systemssocial welfaretwo-player game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Cooperative games (91A12) Welfare economics (91B15)

Abstract: We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model of online social computing systems such as online Q&A forums and of credit sharing in scientific co-authorship settings. We show that the maximum feasible produced value can be well approximated by simple local sharing rules where users are approximately rewarded in proportion to their marginal contributions and that this holds even under incomplete information about the player's abilities and effort constraints. For natural instances we show almost 95% optimality at equilibrium. When players incur a cost for their effort, we identify a threshold phenomenon: the efficiency is a constant fraction of the optimal when the cost is strictly convex and decreases with the number of players if the cost is linear.

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Cited in

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• Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums
• How to incentivize data-driven collaboration among competing parties
• Shared resource management via reward schemes
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• Brief announcement: Towards an abstract model of user retention dynamics
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• Mechanisms for (mis)allocating scientific credit
• Project games
• Fair and resilient incentive tree mechanisms
• Arbitrary profit sharing in federated learning utility games
• Mechanisms for (mis)allocating scientific credit

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