Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm
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(24)- Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer
- Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
- An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Characterization of desirable information processing and decision making systems in organization
- Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
- Decentralization of responsibility for site decontamination projects: A budget allocation approach
- An interactive heuristic for financial planning in decentralized organizations
- Mathematical modeling of China's state-owned enterprises' contract system
- Service capacity decision and incentive compatible cost allocation for reporting usage forecasts
- Misrepresentation-proof strategies in poly-agent systems
- Supply chain disruption management and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers in the quantity-setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods
- Resource allocation for homeland defense: dealing with the team effect
- Reporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studies
- An analysis of supply chain decisions with asymmetrical retailers: effects of disruptions and static service cost on coordination mechanism
- Setting the right incentives for global planning and operations
- Existence and derivation of optimal affine incentive schemes for Stackelberg games with partial information: a geometric approach†
- On misrepresentation-proof strategies in incentive design problems
- Incentive compatible, collaborative production scheduling with simple communication among distributed agents
- A family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problems
- Firms, queues, and coffee breaks: a flow model of corporate activity with delays
- Incentive-compatible cost allocations for inventory games with private information
- Incentive designs for Stackelberg games with a large number of followers and their mean-field limits
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