Incomplete Mechanisms and Efficient Allocation in Labour Markets

DOI10.2307/2297940MaRDI QIDQ3983467zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Douglas Gale

Publication date 27 June 1992

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297940

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionefficient equilibriumincomplete mechanismstrongly monotonic economiesWalrasian model of labour markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Are Incomplete Markets Able to Achieve Minimal Efficiency?
• Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers

Cited in

(12)

• Endogeneous information quality: a job-assignment application
• A market structure for an environment with heterogeneous job-matches, indivisible labor and persistent unemployment
• Imperfectly competitive labour markets and the productivity puzzle.
• Solving dynamic inefficiency with politically sustainable guest worker programs
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment
• Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies
• Efficiency in a search and matching economy with a competitive informal sector
• Fair Wages When Individual Choice Sets Are Incomplete: An Application of a Model with Indivisibilities
• Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
• Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection
• Insiders and outsiders in labour market models

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