Endogeneous information quality: a job-assignment application

DOI10.1007/BF01226933MaRDI QIDQ1367889zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David A. Malueg, Yongsheng Xu

Publication date 6 May 1998

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01226933

zbMATH Keywords

informationtestsjob assignmentskilled and unskilled jobs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Endogenous information acquisition with Cournot competition
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• Endogenous public information and welfare in market games

Cites work

• Incomplete Mechanisms and Efficient Allocation in Labour Markets
• Information in Production
• Testing for ability in a competitive labor market

Cited in

(1)

• Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough

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