Infinite hierarchical potential games
From MaRDI portal
In the paper hierarchical potential games with infinite sets of strategies as well as the Stackelberg equilibria for them are considered. It is proved that the Stackelberg equilibria of such games are exactly minimizers of a potential function. Moreover, sufficient conditions for the existence of a weak Stackelberg equilibrium are obtained.
Recommendations
Cites work
- \(\epsilon\)-mixed strategies for static continuous-kernel Stackelberg games
- A characterization of ordinal potential games
- Approximation of two-person games with information exchange
- Bilevel and multilevel programming: A bibliography review
- Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
- Dynamic noncooperative game theory
- Equilibria and approximate equilibria in infinite potential games
- Equilibrium strategies in dynamic games with multi-levels of hierarchy
- Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games
- New results on approximate solution in two-level optimization
- On generalized Stackelberg strategies
- Potential games
- Sequential production situations and potentials
- Stability of regularized bilevel programming problems
Cited in
(7)- Supermodular games and potential games.
- Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, social welfare and optimal structure in hierarchical continuous public goods game
- Interactive decisions and potential games
- An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748674 (Why is no real title available?)
- REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN VIEW OF JEALOUS OR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR OF PLAYERS
- On Mayer problem for systems governed by second-order ODE
This page was built for publication: Infinite hierarchical potential games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5925724)