Information manipulation and majority rule

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111824MaRDI QIDQ6636871zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bo Wang, Suli Zheng

Publication date 12 November 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111824

zbMATH Keywords

decision-makinginformation manipulationmajority rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Majority Rules and Incentives
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• Propaganda and credulity

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