How risk disciplines pre-commitment (Q1025632)

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Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	How risk disciplines pre-commitment	scientific article

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scholarly article

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How risk disciplines pre-commitment (English)

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zbMATH Open document ID

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10.1007/s11238-007-9085-8

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Christophe Caron

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Theory and Decision

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publication date

19 June 2009

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9085-8

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Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria

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Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

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The values of information in some nonzero sum games

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The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market

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Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility

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Cournot duopoly with two production periods

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Uncertainty, Instability, Expected Profit

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Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

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Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:1025632

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