How risk disciplines pre-commitment

DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9085-8MaRDI QIDQ1025632zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christophe Caron, Thierry Lafay

Publication date 19 June 2009

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9085-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
• Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility
• Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
• Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium

Cites work

• Cournot duopoly with two production periods
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
• The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market
• The values of information in some nonzero sum games
• Uncertainty, Instability, Expected Profit

Cited in

(2)

• Duopolistic competition under risk aversion and uncertainty
• Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

This page was built for publication: How risk disciplines pre-commitment

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1025632)