The rôle of nondegeneracy and homogeneity in n-person game theory: An equivalence theorem (Q1106747)

A measure m (on a finite set, i.e., a vector) is nondegenerate w.r.t. \(\alpha\) if it is uniquely defined by its sets of measure \(\alpha\) (its ``\(\alpha\)-contour''). m is called homogeneous w.r.t. \(\alpha\) if any set of measure exceeding \(\alpha\) contains a subset of exactly measure \(\alpha\). Nondegeneracy and homogeneity are related concepts: in some sense homogeneity is a version of nondegeneracy with several degrees of freedom. Both concepts are useful in connection with the representation of nonadditive functions by means of measures (the unique representation of games in characteristic function form). They also serve to determine extreme points of the cones of nonnegative convex games and superadditive games respectively. In this paper we give further examples for the applicability of nondegeneracy concepts to the main equivalence theorem of equilibrium theory. It is shown that nondegeneracy can be defined meaningfully in the framework of a T.U.-market game. By contrast to the commonly used version, we employ piecewise linear utility functions for the consumer or players. Using a version of nondegeneracy we shall then be able to represent regions in the space \({\mathbb{N}}^ r \)of distributions of players over the r types in the market such that the core and the Walrasian equilibrium coincide.