The bargaining problem without convexity. Extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions (Q1186867)

The bargaining problem is to define a bargaining solution \(F\), which is a function from a domain \(\Sigma\) of pairs \((S,d)\), \(d\in S \subset \mathbb{R}^{n}\), to \(\mathbb{R}^{n}\), such that \(F(S,d) \in S\), and \(F\) satisfies desirable welfare properties. \(\Sigma\) is usually required to be convex. However, let \(\Sigma^ n\) be the set of \((S,d)\) where (A.1) \(S\) is compact, (A.2) \(S\) is \(d\)-comprehensive (if \(d \leq x \leq y\), \(y \in S\), then \(x \in S\)), and (A.3) \((S,d)\) is non-trivial (there exists \(x \in S\) such that \(x \gg d\)). In the words of the authors (p. 366), the results are that ``(1) On [\(\Sigma_{n}\)], there does not exist a solution that satisfies strong Pareto optimality and symmetry; (2) if we replace strong Pareto optimality with weak Pareto optimality, then Kalai and Smorodinsky's characterization of their solution on the domain of convex problems may be extended to [\(\Sigma_{n}\)]; (3) Kalai's characterization of the egalitarian solution may be extended to [\(\Sigma_{n}\)].'' These results are natural and the proofs are straightforward. The article contains several annoying typos. The only serious one is the substitution of ``d-compressive'' for ``\(d\)-comprehensive'' in the statement of (A.2) on p. 366.