The kernel, the bargaining set and the reduced game (Q1196705)

Let \((N,v,B)\) be a game with coalition structure \(B\) and \(\theta(N,v,B)\) represent the set of payoffs of the game under the solution concept \(\theta\). Let \((B_ k,v_ x)\) be the reduced game of \((N,v,B)\) with respect to \(B_ k\in B\) and \(x\in \theta(N,v,B)\). Which solution concepts do satisfy that for \(x\in\theta(N,v,B)\) the section of \(\theta(N,v,B)\) at \(x|_{N-B_ k}\) is \(\theta(B_ k,v_ x)\)? It is well-known that the Shapley value does not have the result. The first author [Int. J. Game Theory 17, No. 4, 311-314 (1988; Zbl 0664.90099)] showed that the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution does not have the property, either. \textit{R. J. Aumann} and \textit{J. H. Drèze} [ibid. 3, 217-237 (1974; Zbl 0313.90074)] proved that the core and the nucleolus have the property. They also proved that the section of the bargaining set of \((N,v,B)\) at \(x|_{N-B_ k}\) is included in the bargaining set of \((B_ k,v_ x)\) if \(x\) is in the bargaining set of \((N,v,B)\). In this paper, we will give an example to illustrate that the section of the kernel of \((N,v,B)\) at \(x|_{N-B_ k}\), where \(x\) is in the kernel of \((N,v,B)\), is a proper subset of the kernel of \((B_ k,v_ x)\). We also prove that under appropriate conditions these two sets coincide. For the bargaining set we prove a similar result.