Schrödinger logics (Q1338481)

The key characteristic of a ``Schrödinger logic'' is apparently that it can distinguish indistinguishability from identity, i.e., in such a logic it will not be the case that the ``Leibniz law'': \(x= y\) iff \(\forall F(F(x)\leftrightarrow F(y))\) holds. Individuals may share all attributes and yet not be identical in the sense of being the same individual. It is argued here that such systems are needed to express quantum descriptions of elementary particles, an argument derived from Schrödinger's claims that ``sameness'' has no meaning when applied to elementary particles. The main purpose of the paper is to present a higher-order logic in which the Leibniz law is violated. In section 2 a first-order system is presented which simply disallows expressions of form \(x= y\) as ill-formed over some part of the domain, i.e. where \(x\), \(y\) are ``\(m\)-atoms'', and in section 3 a higher-order system is developed from this. In such a system the notion of being ``relatively indistinguishable'' is defined so that in particular two individuals may be ``indistinguishable with respect to intrinsic properties'' and yet not be the same individuals. A weak completeness result for this logic is presented in section 4. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the problems associated with such a system, in particular the fact that the semantics, i.e. the ``meta-mathematics'' used to derive a model for the logical system, is based on normal set theory. So the model theory for the Schrödinger logic is based on a system in which the Leibniz law holds. The authors see a need to ``search for new axioms and mathematical systems to treat mathematically those entities which are presented to us by modern physics''.