The modal logic of agreement and noncontingency (Q1430999)

A generalization of the logic of noncontingency is offered. The modal formula ``it is noncontingent whether \(A\)'' is true at a point in a Kripke model just in case all points accessible to that point agree on the truth-value of \(A\). The logic of noncontingency can be thought of as a special case of a more general modal logic of agreement, interpreted with the aid of models supporting a ternary relation \(S\). In such models the modal formula \(\bigcirc A\) is true at a point \(w\) just in case for all points \(x, y\) with \(Swxy\), \(x\) and \(y\) agree on the truth value of \(A\). The noncontingency interpretation is the special case in which \(Swxy\) if and only if \(Rwx\) and \(Rwy\), where \(R\) is the traditional binary accessibility relation. Another application, related to work of Lewis and von Kutschera, allows one to think of \(\bigcirc A\) as saying that \(A\) is entirely about a certain subject matter.