Absorbing team games (Q1577959)

The paper demonstrates the existence of a uniform equilibrium payoff in absorbing team games, supported by relatively simple strategy profiles. Absorbing games are stochastic games where all states but one are absorbing: a stage game is played repeatedly, but for each action profile there is a chance that the process is absorbed into a state where all players receive a fixed payoff forever after. Absorbing team games are absorbing games played by two teams: formally, the set of players may be partitioned into two sets, and the players of each set have the same payoffs (although not necessarily the same action sets). In the equilibrium strategy profiles the players have to play a small perturbation of a stationary mixed-action combination and to test whether deviations occur, the tests being designed so that the probability of false detection of a deviation is small; if a deviation is detected the deviant is punished forever. The result is technically a by-product of a previous result of the author, where he proves an analogous result for three-player absorbing games [Math. Oper. Res. 24, 669-698 (1999; Zbl 1064.91500)], and is part of a broader research project which the author and Nicholas Vieille are pursuing on the deep question of the existence of equilibrium payoffs in general stochastic games.