Absorbing team games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0748MaRDI QIDQ1577959zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eilon Solan

Publication date 28 February 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f415b6515d559bc33388bcd4ec0a7dc15a0fddc5

zbMATH Keywords

deviationsstage gamestochastic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Review text

The paper demonstrates the existence of a uniform equilibrium payoff in absorbing team games, supported by relatively simple strategy profiles. Absorbing games are stochastic games where all states but one are absorbing: a stage game is played repeatedly, but for each action profile there is a chance that the process is absorbed into a state where all players receive a fixed payoff forever after. Absorbing team games are absorbing games played by two teams: formally, the set of players may be partitioned into two sets, and the players of each set have the same payoffs (although not necessarily the same action sets). In the equilibrium strategy profiles the players have to play a small perturbation of a stationary mixed-action combination and to test whether deviations occur, the tests being designed so that the probability of false detection of a deviation is small; if a deviation is detected the deviant is punished forever. The result is technically a by-product of a previous result of the author, where he proves an analogous result for three-player absorbing games [Math. Oper. Res. 24, 669-698 (1999; Zbl 1064.91500)], and is part of a broader research project which the author and Nicholas Vieille are pursuing on the deep question of the existence of equilibrium payoffs in general stochastic games.

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Cited in

(5)

• The modified stochastic game
• Perfect information games where each player acts only once
• Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins
• THE DYNAMICS OF THE NASH CORRESPONDENCE AND n-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES
• Three-Player Absorbing Games

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