Undead argument: the truth-functionality objection to fuzzy theories of vagueness (Q1708883)

The paper discusses one of the objections against theories of vagueness based on fuzzy logics, namely that these theories are incompatible with ordinary usage of compound propositions involving vague predicates in the presence of borderline cases. The author first lists these objections. For example, if a certain blob is on the border of pink and red and $P$ is the sentence `the blob is pink' and $R$ is the sentence `the blob is red', then, according to \textit{K. Fine} [Synthese 30, 265--300 (1975; Zbl 0311.02011)], $P \wedge P$ is equivalent to $P$ and hence not clearly true nor clearly false, while $P \wedge R$ is clearly false. Hence, given that truth degrees of $P$ and $R$ are identical, this is an argument against any truth functional account of conjunction. Several possible responses to these objections are listed. They can be divided into the following three categories: (i) disputing the data, (ii) accommodating the data and (iii) questioning the relevance of data. \par Then, the author proposes a hypothesis falling into category (iii) above saying that intuitions or empirical data from questionaries about compound statements involving vague predicates in the presence of borderline cases do not flow from subjects' competence with those predicates. Therefore, arguments against fuzzy logic-based theories of vagueness relying on these data are not really relevant. Various aspects and consequences of this hypothesis are discussed, notably its relation to the position of fuzzy theories of vagueness among other possible approaches to it. The author concludes that objections mentioned at the beginning of this review do not have any force and that fuzzy theories of vagueness play a central role in the explanation of ordinary usage of vague language.