Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox. (Q1867814)

In this paper the basic assumption was that constitution can be modeled by effectivity functions, and the quest was for game forms (modeling the practical implementation of a constitution) that (i) represtent the constitution, i.e. reflect the distribution of power implicit in the constitution; (ii) are stable in the sense of possessing at least one Nash equilibrium for any distribution of preferences. The main results are as follows. For general effectivity functions, i.e. without any special structure on the set of alternatives (social state), a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash consistent representation was given in terms of the polar effectivity for individuals: this condition amounts to the intuitive requirement that individuals should not be too powerful (condition (1)). A similar result was obtained for the case where the set of alternatives is a topological space and the effectivity function is topological (condition (4)). For the special case of topological veto functions they found as a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash consistent representation a simple numerical condition on the veto function (condition (9)). Some good examples are given to explain the possibility of the results. Moreover, with respect to the Sen paradox, there are always Pareto optimal ones. Remark 3.8 and Theorem 4.7. In the appendix A the authors prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash consistent representation.