Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient? (Q1904838)
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| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient? |
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Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient? (English)
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19 May 1996
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A formal mathematical model is developed to ascertain the effectiveness of a reporting system for improving the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations when reports are costly. To model realistic enforcement problems arising over environmental issues such as compliance to water and air quality standards, a formal enforcement model is constructed using concepts from probability and statistics, non-cooperative game theory, and economics. The calculation and comparison Nash equilibria for a range of values of model parameters indicates under what conditions a reporting system can be truly effective.
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whistle-blowing
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compliance
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probability
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statistics
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non-cooperative game theory
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economics
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Nash equilibria
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