A hierarchy of classical and paraconsistent logics (Q2301322)

There is a consensual agreement in abstract logic that a logic is a pair of objects (in most times logicians accept, in the Tarskian tradition, that a consequence relation is defined between sets of formulas and formulas). To determine whether two logics are, or at least can be viewed as, identicals is a typical inquiry, usually, in the domains of abstract and universal logic [\textit{J.-Y. Beziau} (ed.), Logica universalis. Towards a general theory of logic. 2nd revised ed. Basel: Birkhäuser (2007; Zbl 1138.03002)]. The current research evaluates exactly the problem of what are the criteria to determine identity between logics. By means of very interesting constructions and arguments in a framework of sequent calculi, the authors attempted to show that the standard identity criteria for logics is not correct. They propose a new one based on the notion of metainference and they argue that to identify two logics we have to take into account all inferential levels, and not only the level of valid inferences in a given formal system. Besides this main idea, there are other relevant results in non-classical logics.