A cube of opposition for predicate logic (Q2307718)

The author clearly states the key intention of his article: ``to examine relational syllogistic construed as predicate logic by visualization in a cube of opposition'' (C.O). Moreover he adds: ``This is done by devising a cube for the considered predicate logical fragment in which the traditional square arises as a special case'' (p. 103). Let us recall a basic concept: the traditional square of opposition (S.O). Such a logical diagram originated with Aristotle and represents the logical theory of the four categorical forms, placed at the square's vertices: Every \(A\) is \(B\); No \(A\) is \(B\); Some \(A\) is \(B\); Some \(A\) is not \(B\). Contraries, subcontraries, subalterns and contradictories correspond to the edges and the diagonal. Nilsson envisages two quantifiers (``every'' and ``some''), two monadic predicates \(C\) and \(D\), a binary predicate \(R\), and the negation sign. Then he defines 8 predicate logical assertoric closed sentences (every every; every some; some every; some some; each with optionally postfixed/prefixed negation sign). Inspired by the Aristotelian S.O, he devises a cube for the relational predicate logic (p. 105). If the relation \(R\) is ``equality'', the front square of this cube becomes the traditional S.O; the rear square is defined by four ``unorthodox'' cases (p. 107). Besides the cube can be construed in Aristotelian modal logic with modalities of necessity and possibility (p. 108). Nilsson remarks that ``pairs of the sentence forms that are neither opposed by contradictories nor by contraries, nor connected by the directed, transitive subalterns are known as `disparatae'.'' These sentences form a tetrahedron embedded into the cube (p. 109). Then begins, so it seems to me, the most appealing part of this work (pp. 109--110). A brief remainder is in order: the Klein's 4-group (\(G\)) has two generators \(a\), \(b\) which are related according to \(a.a = b.b = 1\) and are commutative (\(a.b = b.a\)). G has four elements: \(I\), \(a\), \(b\), \(ab\) (\(I\) is the identity). The author points out that \(G\) is present at all corners of the cube. ``This becomes apparent by taking the devised three surface-diagonal forms of opposition constituted by the two forms of negation \(\operatorname{neg} S\) (sentential negation) and \(\operatorname{neg} R\) (relational negation) and \(\mathrm{inv Q}\) (the quantifier inversion), supplemented with the identity operation'' (p. 109). Hence \(G = (I, \mathrm{neg S}, \operatorname{neg} R, \operatorname{inv} Q)\). Note that \((\operatorname{neg} S\, \operatorname{neg} S = (\operatorname{neg} R\, \operatorname{neg} R) = (\operatorname{inv} Q\, \operatorname{inv} Q) = I\) and \((\operatorname{neg} S\, \operatorname{neg} R = \operatorname{inv} Q)\). At once a question arises: may a logical meaning be associated with a representation of \(G\)? Moreover: Is this very question meaningful? At the end of the paper Nilsson writes that ``from an aesthetic point of view the C.O suffers from an unbalance, in that all negation signs appears at the right. This unbalance is overcome in a four-dimensional version of the three dimensional cube'' (p. 110, fig. 8). Such symmetry considerations are quite interesting, but I am not sure that I get the point: in the resulting tesseract negation signs appear at all the ``outer'' cube vertices and the lack of symmetry of the original ``inner'' cube remains. Perhaps the desired symmetry is hidden inside the brief word ``all''.