The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Q2350936)

The paper consists of five sections. In the introductory Section 1 the main objectives of the note and the related literature are presented. In Section 2 main concepts and preliminaries are defined. Sections 3 and 4 constitute the core of the paper. In Section 3 the authors give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons (Theorem 3.6). Section 4 presents consequences of the decomposition theorem. More precisely, the authors characterize the non-emptiness of both the equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in this set (Corollary 4.1). It is shown that the Lorenz-maximal element dominates every other element in the polyhedron (Lemma 4.3) and that the set of Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core is finite (Theorem 4.4). From their results the authors obtain a method for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core. Concluding remarks in Section 5 terminate the paper.