The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

DOI10.1007/S00186-015-0494-0zbMath1336.91015OpenAlexW2018501925MaRDI QIDQ2350936

Francesc Llerena, Cori Vilella

Publication date: 25 June 2015

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/212194

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gameLorenz dominationequal division coreequity core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Proportional share analysis
• An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games
• Constrained egalitarian allocations
• On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games.
• On the equal division core
• The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core

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