On descriptional propositions in Ibn Sīnā: elements for a logical analysis (Q2658294)

Ibn Sīnā (known to the scholastics of medieval Europe as Avicenna) made much of the distinction between what were later called descriptional (waṣfī) and substantial (ḏātī) propositions. In case of the universal proposition Every \(S\) is \(P\), we may contrast the descriptional Every \(S\), so long as it is \(S\), is \(P\). with the substantial Every \(S\), so long as it exists, is \(P\). Thus every bachelor, so long as he is a bachelor, is unmarried; but it is not the case that every bachelor, so long as he exists, is unmarried, for he may get married without ceasing to exist. But every human, so long as he or she exists, is animal, and in that case the descriptional and the substantial coincide. The present paper analyses Ibn Sīnā's views using the constructive type theory of \textit{P. Martin-Löf} [Intuitionistic type theory. Notes by Giovanni Sambin of a Series of Lectures given in Padua, June 1980. Napoli: Bibliopolis (1984; Zbl 0571.03030)], which is better able than other modern logics to reflect the subject-predicate and the time-span modality structure with which Ibn Sīnā was working. For the entire collection see [Zbl 1459.03003].