Russell's metaphysical logic (Q2734845)

The author asks about the relation between B. Russell's logical and metaphysical views. He maintains: ``Russell did not view logic as an uninterpreted calculus waiting for many interpretations. Rather, for Russell, logic is a single `interpreted' body of \textit{a priori} truths, of propositions rather than sentence forms'' (pp.\ 5-6). The author's thesis is ``that Russell's logical and metaphysical views are not only compatible, but that his metaphysics and logic inform each other'' (p.\ 6). He argues for this thesis by investigating into several topics, e.g., the role of propositional functions and propositions in Russell's logical theory, especially in \textit{Principia mathematica} (chapters 2 and 3), his attempts to avoid paradoxes by proposing a ramified theory of types (chapters 4 and 5), the special nature of the axiom of reducibility and its relation to semantics (ch.\ 6), and several forms of logical constructions (ch.\ 7).