Fixed points in epistemic game theory (Q2918874)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6089090
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| English | Fixed points in epistemic game theory |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6089090 |
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1 October 2012
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epistemic game theory
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fixed points theory
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Fixed points in epistemic game theory (English)
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This short and technical paper deals with the charactrization of two solution concepts in finite game theory by using order-theoretic fixed-point arguments. To be precise (from the abstract), ``the epistemic conditions of \textit{rationality and commom belief of rationality} and \textit{rationality and common assumption of rationality} in game theory are characterized by the solution concepts of a \textit{best-response set} and a \textit{self-admissible set} respectively.NEWLINENEWLINEThe authors characterize each solution concept as the set of fixed points of a non-monotone map on the lattice of rectangular subsets of the product of the strategy sets.''NEWLINENEWLINEFor the entire collection see [Zbl 1245.00037].
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