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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3849010
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3849010 |
Statements
1981
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519.00015
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power index
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minimal winning coalitions
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axiomatic characterization
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dual of a simple game
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dual power indices
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0.93810177
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0.9359427
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0.92728215
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0.92609096
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0.9257319
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0.91146916
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0.9071306
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0.90186936
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0.8929982
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[For the entire collection see Zbl 0519.00015.] We generalize a previous power index of the authors [Int. J. Game Theory 7, 113-123 (1978; Zbl 0389.90093)] by abandoning the assumption that all minimal winning coalitions form with equal likelihood. By allowing such coalitions to form in accordance with varying probability functions we obtain a family of power indices and develop an accompanying axiomatic characterization. In comparing our approach with that of \textit{D. Blair} [''Essays in social choice theory'', Ph. D. Dissertation, Yale Univ. (1976)] and \textit{P. Dubey} [Int. J. Game Theory 4, 131-139 (1974; Zbl 0352.90085)], we observe that the indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf emerge from one particular type of construction, while our family of indices derives from a fundamentally different construction. Finally, we consider a few examples, after which we discuss and compare properties, axioms, and paradoxes that obtain for the various indices discussed above. We also introduce the notion of the dual of a simple game. We then develop a family of dual power indices and present the altered axioms which characterize this dual family.
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