No label defined (Q3318577)

From MaRDI portal

!

This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3849010
Language Label Description Also known as
default for all languages
No label defined
    English
    No label defined
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3849010

      Statements

      0 references
      0 references
      1981
      0 references
      519.00015
      0 references
      power index
      0 references
      minimal winning coalitions
      0 references
      axiomatic characterization
      0 references
      dual of a simple game
      0 references
      dual power indices
      0 references
      [For the entire collection see Zbl 0519.00015.] We generalize a previous power index of the authors [Int. J. Game Theory 7, 113-123 (1978; Zbl 0389.90093)] by abandoning the assumption that all minimal winning coalitions form with equal likelihood. By allowing such coalitions to form in accordance with varying probability functions we obtain a family of power indices and develop an accompanying axiomatic characterization. In comparing our approach with that of \textit{D. Blair} [''Essays in social choice theory'', Ph. D. Dissertation, Yale Univ. (1976)] and \textit{P. Dubey} [Int. J. Game Theory 4, 131-139 (1974; Zbl 0352.90085)], we observe that the indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf emerge from one particular type of construction, while our family of indices derives from a fundamentally different construction. Finally, we consider a few examples, after which we discuss and compare properties, axioms, and paradoxes that obtain for the various indices discussed above. We also introduce the notion of the dual of a simple game. We then develop a family of dual power indices and present the altered axioms which characterize this dual family.
      0 references

      Identifiers

      0 references
      0 references
      0 references
      0 references