scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3849010

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Publication:3318577





[For the entire collection see Zbl 0519.00015.] We generalize a previous power index of the authors [Int. J. Game Theory 7, 113-123 (1978; Zbl 0389.90093)] by abandoning the assumption that all minimal winning coalitions form with equal likelihood. By allowing such coalitions to form in accordance with varying probability functions we obtain a family of power indices and develop an accompanying axiomatic characterization. In comparing our approach with that of \textit{D. Blair} [Essays in social choice theory, Ph. D. Dissertation, Yale Univ. (1976)] and \textit{P. Dubey} [Int. J. Game Theory 4, 131-139 (1974; Zbl 0352.90085)], we observe that the indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf emerge from one particular type of construction, while our family of indices derives from a fundamentally different construction. Finally, we consider a few examples, after which we discuss and compare properties, axioms, and paradoxes that obtain for the various indices discussed above. We also introduce the notion of the dual of a simple game. We then develop a family of dual power indices and present the altered axioms which characterize this dual family.











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