Curry's paradox and \(\omega \)-inconsistency (Q361866)

It is shown that a number of logics with only the connectives \(\to\), \(\perp\) and \(\exists\) can be reduced to triviality by a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. The infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic Ł\(_\infty\) avoids this but is \(\omega\)-inconsistent as had been shown model-theoretically by \textit{G. Restall} [Log. Anal., Nouv. Sér. 35, No. 139--140, 303--312 (1992; Zbl 0832.03010)]. Here, we have a proof-theoretic argument for the same conclusion, and the isolation of the principle \((\phi\to \exists x \psi ) \vdash\exists x (\phi\to\psi)\) as responsible. It is shown that two subsystems of Ł\(_\infty\) each lacks that principle. Neither has the contraction axiom \((\phi\to(\phi\to\psi))\to(\phi\to\psi)\), and each is more intuitionist in flavor than the original.