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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3926672
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3926672 |
Statements
1985
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sequential game
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systems theory
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n-person non-cooperative games
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existence of equilibrium points
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approximate equilibrium points
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polyhedral games
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Bimatrix games
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matrix games
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games over the unit square
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games over metric spaces
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nonconvex programming
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von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
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core
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kernel
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nucleolus
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Shapley value
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bargaining set
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incomplete information
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0.8773497939109802
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0.8767055869102478
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Starting with a chapter on systems theory the concept of equilibrium is introduced. In the second chapter n-person non-cooperative games are placed in this framework. In the subsequent chapters theorems on the existence of equilibrium points are treated and methods to find or approximate equilibrium points are discussed. Special games, which can be solved efficiently like polyhedral games, are treated. The Scarf-Hansen algorithm for approximating an equilibrium point is given. Several chapters are devoted to 2-person games and methods to solve them. Bimatrix games, matrix games, games over the unit square and games over metric spaces are discussed. An algorithm of Majthay to solve a bimatrix game is treated. Linear programming and the method of fictitious play are used to deal with matrix games. Games over the unit square are handled by approximating them by a matrix game or by reduction to a nonconvex programming problem. Stochastic games and recursive games are treated in one chapter. Cooperative games in characteristic function form are introduced. The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, the core, the kernel, the nucleolus, the Shapley value and the bargaining set of a cooperative game are introduced. Various examples of cooperative games arising from real world situations are given. The last chapter is on games with incomplete information and deals with the basic features of the Harsanyi and Selten models. The book concludes with 213 references.
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