Pensions in Labor Contracts (Q3790908)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4055337
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    Pensions in Labor Contracts
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4055337

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      Pensions in Labor Contracts (English)
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      1988
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      two-period employment contract
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      asymmetric information
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      risk aversion
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      equilibrium pension schedule
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      This paper cosiders the optimality of a two-period employment contract between a firm and a worker under asymmetric information and risk aversion. In this contract, the firm provides the worker with insurance against states of low consumption that arise from volatile productivities as well as from quits and dismissals. The contract consists of a two-part payment schedule in which the worker receives wages from the firm during the periods in which he is employed by the firm and a pension benefit at the end of the second period when he is retired. The amount of pension payment depends on whether he continues employment with, or is separated from, the firm in the second period. In this model, quits and dismissal are allowed. The paper explores how the equilibrium pension schedule is determined and derives the conditions under which pensions constitute a form of severance pay and under which they impose vesting requirement. The paper studies how the insurance features of the wage / pension contract are affected by asymmetry in information and risk aversion, mobility of the worker, and the firm's policy regarding employee retention. In particular, the paper shows that the greater the firm's perceived probability of separation, the more likely the pension plan will provide for vesting requirements. Moreover, a firm that is reluctant to fire workers tends to provide for severance pay, while one that fires unproductive workers tends to impose vesting requirements.
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