Pensions in Labor Contracts

DOI10.2307/2526793MaRDI QIDQ3790908zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sheng Cheng Hu

Publication date 1988

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526793

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationequilibrium pension schedulerisk aversiontwo-period employment contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

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Cited in

(3)

• Optimal design of pension funds: a mission impossible?
• Pension expectations as disincentives to job mobility
• The Role of Turnover Costs in the Enforcement of Performance-Related Pay Contracts

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