Auxiliary equilibria for differential and static games (Q393868)

Let \(G\subset Q_1\times\cdots\times Q_N\) be a compact set, where \(Q_i\), \(i=1,2,\dots,N\), are metric spaces. Let \(J_i(q)\), \(i=1,\dots,N\), \(q=q_1,q_2,\dots,q_N\in G\) be continuous functionals and \(P_k\) be any coalition of \(k\) players. In this paper a conflict problem is considered in which the coalition \(P_k\) is interested in maximazing its payoff \(J_{P_k}(q)=\sum_{i\in P_k}J_i(q)\) by choosing a strategy \(q_{P_k}\) from the projection of the set \(G\) on the space \(\prod_{i\in P_k}Q_i.\) For the considered problem new notions of conflict equilibria are introduced. A method for searching for conflict and strongest equilibria is proposed.