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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1259119
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1259119 |
Statements
9 March 1999
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mathesis universalis
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formal logic
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formal mathematics
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axiomatics
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definite manifolds
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definition
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phenomenological semantics
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modalization
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modal logic
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provability
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possible worlds semantics
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interpretations of modal logic compatible with the phenomenological approach to mathematics
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phenomenological criticism of modern modal logic
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natural language
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0.7773028612136841
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0.7603472471237183
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0.7492882013320923
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0.7464228868484497
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The author's aim is to point out interpretations of modal logic which are compatible with the phenomenological approach to mathematics. The book consists of three parts with ten chapters. In the first part (pp. 19-77) the author presents E. Husserl's conception of a ``mathesis universalis''. For Husserl, the mathesis universalis contains both, formal mathematics and formal (symbolic) logic. It has a hierarchical structure consisting of a pure logical grammar, a logic of consequences and a logic of truths. The author pays special attention to the differences between formal logic and formal mathematics which can be observed despite their extensional identity. In the second part (pp. 81-143) the author presents what he calls ``phenomenological semantics'', i.e. the phenomenological theory of modalization being a general analysis of intentions. The author distinguishes three levels of modalization, the level of protological passive synthesis, the level of protological active synthesis, and the level of (logical) predication. The third part (pp. 147-194) combines the results of the preceding parts in a phenomenological criticism of modern modal logic, especially its interpretation as possible worlds semantics. The problems of applying this semantics to natural language are seen as anchor points of phenomenlogical criticism. The provability interpretation of modal logic is proposed as a genetic interpretation, notwithstanding the problems which Hilbert's program and Husserl's closely related idea of definite manifolds had with Gödel's and Church's results.
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