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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1150557
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1150557 |
Statements
10 May 1998
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realism
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structuralism
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patterns
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mathematical objects
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mathematical epistemology
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mathematical ontology
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disquotational theory of truth
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formalism
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indispensability argument
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modal-structuralism
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mathematical/physical distinction
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evidence
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philosophy of mathematics
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Quine-Putnam indispensibility thesis
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0.8855230808258057
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0.8489585518836975
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0.8131037950515747
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The author argues for his realistic position in the philosophy of mathematics which he characterizes in ontological respects as a form of structuralism according to which ``mathematical objects are featureless, abstract positions in structures (or more suggestively, patterns)'' (p. 4). The author regards the Quine-Putnam indispensibility thesis (``Referring to mathematical objects and invoking mathematical principles is indispensable to the practise of natural science'', p. 45) as a strong prima facie case for mathematical realism. Critical positions towards this thesis, like Hartry Field's ``synthetic science'', Charles Chihara's ``constructibility theory'', Philip Kitcher's idealizations, and Geoffrey Hellman's modal-structuralism, are refuted. Several doubts about realism are rejected. In the second part a neutral epistemology of mathematics is developed, discussing the ``elusive'' distinction between mathematical and physical objects, holism, local conceptions of mathematical evidence and positing of mathematical objects. In the last part the author presents his theory of mathematics as a science of patterns, finally bringing together structuralism, realism, his (i.e. Tarski's) ``disquotational approach'' to truth and his rejection of a rigid abstract/concrete distinction.
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