scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1150557

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4388799





The author argues for his realistic position in the philosophy of mathematics which he characterizes in ontological respects as a form of structuralism according to which ``mathematical objects are featureless, abstract positions in structures (or more suggestively, patterns) (p. 4). The author regards the Quine-Putnam indispensibility thesis (``Referring to mathematical objects and invoking mathematical principles is indispensable to the practise of natural science, p. 45) as a strong prima facie case for mathematical realism. Critical positions towards this thesis, like Hartry Field's ``synthetic science, Charles Chihara's ``constructibility theory, Philip Kitcher's idealizations, and Geoffrey Hellman's modal-structuralism, are refuted. Several doubts about realism are rejected. In the second part a neutral epistemology of mathematics is developed, discussing the ``elusive distinction between mathematical and physical objects, holism, local conceptions of mathematical evidence and positing of mathematical objects. In the last part the author presents his theory of mathematics as a science of patterns, finally bringing together structuralism, realism, his (i.e. Tarski's) ``disquotational approach to truth and his rejection of a rigid abstract/concrete distinction.




Cited in
(81)








This page was built for publication:

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4388799)