No label defined (Q4390779)

\textit{B. H. Slater}, in ``Paraconsistent logics?'' [J. Philos. Log. 24, 451-454 (1995; Zbl 0830.03002)], argued that if a paraconsistent logic assigns the value ``true'' both to \(A\) and to \(\sim A\), this shows only that \(\sim A\) is not the negation of \(A\). Replying, Restall defines paraconsistency as the view that the inference from \(A \wedge\sim A\) to arbitrary \(B\) (ex falso quodlibet) is not valid. One may be a paraconsistentist without further accepting dialethism, the view that there are true (regular dialethism), or possibly true (light dialethism), contradictions. Relevance logicians are paraconsistentist without being dialethist. The non-dialethic paraconsistentist will say that a valuation assigning ``true'' to both \(A\) and \(\sim A\) does not imply them being possibly true together; the valuation represents a things cannot be. Hence Slater's argument does not defeat non-dialethic paraconsistency. The (regular) dialethist paraconsistentist, such as \textit{Graham Priest} [In contradiction: A study of the transconsistent (1987; Zbl 0682.03002)], must accept Slater's conclusion (namely that for some propositions \(\sim A\) is not the negation of \(A\)), but will also accept that \(\sim A\) \textit{is} the negation of \(A\), and Priest has done this.