Cooperative advertising in a supply chain with horizontal competition (Q473882)

Summary: Cooperative advertising programs are usually provided by manufacturers to stimulate retailers investing more in local advertising to increase the sales of their products or services. While previous literature on cooperative advertising mainly focuses on a ``single-manufacturer single-retailer'' framework, the decision-making framework with ``multiple-manufacturer single-retailer'' becomes more realistic because of the increasing power of retailers as well as the increased competition among the manufacturers. In view of this, in this paper we investigate the cooperative advertising program in a ``two-manufacturer single-retailer'' supply chain in three different scenarios; that is, (i) each channel member makes decisions independently; (ii) the retailer is vertically integrated with one manufacturer; (iii) two manufacturers are horizontally integrated. Utilizing differential game theory, the open-loop equilibrium-advertising strategies of each channel member are obtained and compared. Also, we investigate the effects of competitive intensity on the firm's profit in three different scenarios by using the numerical analysis.