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This essay presents a retrospective of the development of deontic logic by its modern founder. Much is historical overview, especially of the author's own contributions to this field, but attention is also directed toward some fundamental problems within deontic logic that may deserve more investigation than they are often given. One, often called `Jørgensen's Dilemma', is the question of how there can be a logic of norms when norms are inherently neither true nor false. Here the author would distinguish between norms \textit{per se} and `norm statements', which say that a norm exists, or between prescriptive and descriptive normative statements. The latter are true or false, and subject to classical consequence, the former not. Deontic logic might be construed as applying to either, but as a logic of normative statements standard, deontic logics seem to impose unrealistic constraints on normative systems. Regarding norms themselves, though neither true nor false, the author proposes that relations of consistency and entailment can, nevertheless, be defined in terms of the `doability' of the actions they enjoin, and thus deontic logic might be reinstated as a logic of norms \textit{per se}. Other issues discussed include the distinction between `ought-to-be' (Sein-Sollen) and `ought-to-do' (Tun-Sollen), the concept of (strong) permission, the concepts of commitment and conditional obligation, and the need to ground deontic logic in a logic of action. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0918.00016].