No label defined (Q4938866)

The `fundamental problem' for deontic logic addressed here is what is widely known as `Jørgensen's Dilemma': How can there be a logic of norms, since norms are neither true nor false? That is, how can one define a legitimate consequence relation on items that inherently lack truth-value? Accepting its presupposition, the author attacks this problem head on, extending ideas of Alchourrón and Bulygin to provide a framework for statements of conditional norms, including both obligation and strong permission. The approach here is a hybrid of syntax and semantics. It is not axiomatic, but neither does it give a `possible worlds' semantics for deontic statements. Instead, it regards normative systems syntactically, as constructions from formulas, and then evaluates deontic formulas in terms of deductive `output' from their normative system. To accommodate conditional obligation, a normative system (for obligation) is a set of pairs of purely Boolean formulas \((A,B)\); then \(O(A/B)\) is true just when \(A\) is a member of the output of \(B\). The trick is to define `output'. Classical consequence won't do, due to the directionality of conditional norms. Instead, the author introduces a process of `iterative detachment' from the initial promulgations of the system. This requires some sophistication by means of labelling in order to formulate consistency constraints on permissible detachments, necessary to treat contrary-to-duty cases. Strong permission is treated analogously. To demonstrate the adequacy of the account, the author points out a number of desirable theses that it validates, and undesirable theses that it rejects, and then applies it to a variety of `hard cases' familiar from the literature of deontic logic. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0918.00016].