No label defined (Q4946225)

In the paper a formal apparatus is introduced that brings together two traditions in the logic of belief, namely doxastic (epistemic) logic and the AGM logic of theory change. It may sound as if there is nothing doxastic about theory change; however, the kind of theory change that has been most thoroughly investigated is belief revision. What distinguishes Hintikka type doxastic logic from belief revision is that the former is static, the latter dynamic. Hintikka studies the unchanging beliefs of a certain rational agent, AGM how rational belief might change in the face of new information. Nowadays there is general agreement about the importance of distinguishing between collecting information about an unchanging world and collecting information about a world in change. It is belief revision of the former kind that AGM theory studies. The latter kind of information collection is often called updating and requires a special, more complicated analysis. In the paper the focus is on belief change in a world that does not change. Three kinds of change are prominent in current theories about belief revision: expansion and revision on the one hand, and contraction on the other. These are studied as epistemic or doxastic actions. Belief revision talk is rendered in dynamic logic. A language is introduced and its relational and hypertheoretical semantics are compared. It is clear that the hypertheoretical semantics is more general than the relational one. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0927.00010].