Prolegomena to dynamic logic for belief revision (Q813422)

The author describes this paper as prolegomena in the sense of providing a `sound semantic foundation\dots before starting the real work' of detailed analysis of belief revision. As is customary in epistemic and dynamic logics, and in contrast with the AGM approach to belief change, modal operators for belief and knowledge are brought into the object language (to define the notion of an epistemic state), and dynamic modal operators are also placed in the object language (to pass from one state to another). The paper builds on earlier work viewing belief revision from the perspective of dynamic logic, for example that of \textit{K. Segerberg} [``Two traditions in the logic of belief: bringing them together'', Trends Log. Stud. Log. Libr. 5, 135--147 (1999; Zbl 0957.03023)]; and the author's constructions are closely related to those of \textit{O. Board} [``Dynamic interactive epistemology'', Games Econ. Behav. 49, 49--80 (2004; Zbl 1068.91071)].