J.-H. Lambert's theory of probable syllogisms (Q541815)

This short paper investigates J.-H. Lambert's theory of probable syllogism and makes the case for a modern treatment of the principles underlying Lambert's work from the 1760s. After a brief introduction, the author puts Lambert's work in a wider context by considering the work of some of Lambert's contemporaries. Lambert's approach is a renewal of Aristotelian logic by incorporating probability theory. The two main new ingredients are the Leibnizian principle of \textit{mathesis universalis} and a theory of appearance. To separate the field of the probable from the field of the true, Lambert distinguishes two types of proof. On the one hand there are rigorous deductions by a sequence of propositions, on the other hand there are ``moral arguments'' yielding moral proofs. To construct his model of probable syllogism, Lambert distinguishes three classes of probabilities: i) a priori probability, ii) a posteriori probability, and iii) probability of inductions. In the fourth section the author studies Lambert's treatment of propositions such as ``some \(A\) are \(B\)'' in the underlying model of a lottery (gambling). Thus the probability of a proposition is identified with a degree of certainty. In particular the author applies Lambert's classification of propositions which are taken to either true, indeterminate or false. In the fifth section the author shows how the developed theory can be applied to testimonies, in particular the credibility of testimonies. Section 6 contains the conclusions in which the author states that Lambert's aim is to study probabilistic reasoning for the purpose of determining the probability of testimonies.