Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-24), Volume I (Q5801622)

The editors wrote a preface which describes the importance of the papers for the development of the theory, and contains notes on problems which are still unsolved. Part I: ``Finite Games'' consists of 11 papers, the first 9 of which concern games played by two players which are ``zero-sum'', i. e. any payment made by one player is received by the other. Nos. 10 and 11 deal with \(n\)-person games (n > 2). In the four papers of Part II: ``Infinite Games'' again zero-sum two-person games are studied, but the set of pure strategies (see below) is not finite. The volume ends with a bibliography. It is convenient to mention here some of the fundamental concepts of zero-sum two-person games which occur in the papers reviewed below. From an algebraic point of view the theory of these games considers the ``pay-off matrix'' \((a_{ij})\) \((i = 1, \ldots, m;\ j = 1, \ldots, n)\) and the function \(\Phi(x, y) = \sum \sum x_i a_{ij} y_j\), where all \(x_i\) and all \(y_j\) are non-negative and \(\sum x_i = \sum y_j = 1\). Such vectors \(x\) and \(y\) are called ``mixed strategies'' of players I and II, respectively; they are composed of ``pure strategies'' \((1, 0, \ldots, 0), \ldots (0, 0, \ldots, 1)\). Any pair of strategies \(x\) and \(y\) is a solution if \(\sum_i x_ia_{ij}\ge v\) for all \(j\) and \(\sum_j a_{ij} y_j\le v\) for all \(i\). \(v\) is called Contents: Preface; Part I. Finite Games 1. H. Weyl, The elementary theory of convex polyhedra (3-18) (translation by H. W. Kuhn of [Comment. Math. Helv. 7, 290--306 (1935; Zbl 0011.41104; JFM 61.1382.01); 2. H. Weyl, Elementary proof of a mlnimax theorem due to von Neumann (19--26); 3. L. S. Shapley and R. N. Snow, Basic solutions of discrete games (27--36); 4. D. Gale and S. Sherman, Solutions of finite two-person games (37--50); 5. H. F. Bohnenblust, S. Karlin and L. S. Shapley; Solutions of discrete two-person games (51--72); 6. G. W. Brown and J. von Neumann, Solutions of games by differential equations (73--80); 7. D. Gale, H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, On symmetric games (81--88); 8. D. Gale, H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, Reductions of game matrices (89--96); 9. H. W. Kuhn, A simplified two-person poker (97--104); 10. J. F. Nash and L. S. Shapley, A simple three-person poker game (105--116); 11. J. C. C. McKinsey, Isomorphism of games and strategic equivalence (117--131). Part II. Infinite Games 12. S. Karlin, Operator treatment of minmax principle (133--154); 13. H. F. Bohnenblust and S. Karlin, On a theorem of Ville (155--160); 14. M. Dresher, S. Karlin and L. S. Shapley, Polynomial games (161--180); 15. H. F. Bohnenblust, S. Karlin and L. S. Shapley, Games with continuous, convex pay-off (181--192). Bibliography. The articles will be reviewed individually, see ``Contrib. Theory of Games, Ann. Math. Stud. 24''.