Avoiding foregone conclusions: Geometric and foundational analysis of paradoxes of finite additivity. (With comments) (Q5932167)

In Section 1 the author considers an example of paradoxes. The case for allowing finitely additive measures has been studied by \textit{B. De Finetti} [``Theory of probability. A critical introductory treatment''. Vol. 1 (1974; Zbl 0328.60002), Vol. 2 (1975; Zbl 0328.60003)]. The example is discussed by \textit{J. B. Kadane} et al. (1996). In Section 2 he presents an informal treatment of the above paradox. In Section 3 he introduces a geometric approach within which this treatment may be formulated. In Section 4 the paradox is studied from this new point. In Section 5 the author uses this formalism to the fundamental question. Section 6 presents a foundational resolution of the paradox. In Section 7 the value of an experiment is considered. In Section 8 the approximation finite outcome spaces are considered. Section 9 contains the conclusions. The author presents three reasons to clarify paradoxes of finite additivity.NEWLINENEWLINENEWLINERelatively to the comments, W. Sudderth appreciates the paper of Professor Goldstein. In this sense he presents an interesting example which was attributed to Lester Dubins by \textit{B. De Finetti} [``Probability, induction and statistics. The art of guessing'' (1972; Zbl 0275.60001), p. 205].