Bargaining power in communication networks (Q5932218)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1595374
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| English | Bargaining power in communication networks |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1595374 |
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Bargaining power in communication networks (English)
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1 April 2002
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In this paper, the author studies the effect of the place of a player in a network of communications to her bargaining power with respect to others. The bargaining game considered here is an adaption of Rubinstein-Ståhl alternating offers game and it is shown that the \(n\)-player noncooperative bargaining game on the network of communications has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. The author provides the resulting allocation rule and defines the bargaining power measure in the communication network. This bargaining power measure satisfies properties of efficiency, anonymity, monotonicity, local impact, weighted fairness and fair reallocation.
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communication
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bargaining power
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networks
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monotonocity
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efficiency and anonymity
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0.8398693799972534
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0.8157288432121277
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0.8087965846061707
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0.7988967895507812
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