Substitutional validity for modal logic (Q6187414)

This paper proposes a modal extension of the substitutional approach to the analysis of logical consequence put forward in [\textit{V. Halbach}, ``The substitutional analysis of logical consequence'', Noûs 54, 431--450 (2020)]. This approach is axiomatic, and using it one can show that logical truths are true and that validity preserves truth simply by looking at the definitions. Validity is taken to be truth under all substitutions of the nonlogical vocabulary. Here, the \(\Box\) operator is interpreted as substitutional validity, providing a way of talking about what is substitutionally valid. For other interpretations of modality, such as deontic or doxastic, the substitutional account is not an alternative to the Kripke-style semantics. The language used in this work is that of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, enriched with a satisfaction operator and the modal one. The substitutions used to define validity have some restrictions. For example, they are not allowed to rename free variables or add modal operators. A concept of satisfaction under assignments is used to define simple truth. By changing the sets of considered substitutions, different theories of truth are defined some of which are proven to be inconsistent. The derived consequence relation is analyzed by means of defining an accessibility relation between formulas whenever one is a substitution of the other. Soundness and completeness theorems are given for different extensions of modal logic with respect to their corresponding theories of truth.