Minimax principles for mixed variational inequalities driven by uniformly monotone operators (Q6189923)

Let \(X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n\) be a choice set, \(K \subseteq X\) be a constraint set and \(\succ\) be a strict preference relation on \(X\). The strictly preference set-valued map \(P: X \rightrightarrows X\) is defined by \(P(x) = \{z \in X: z \succ x\}\). A point \(\overline{x} \in K\) is a maximal element for \(P\) on \(K\) if \(P(\overline{x}) \cap K = \emptyset\). In this case, it said that \(\overline{x}\) solves problem M (K, P). Define the set-valued function \(G: X \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^C\), by \(G(x) = \text{ conv } \{h \in \mathbb{R}^C: \|h \| =1,\; \langle h, z - x \rangle \leq 0\; \;\forall z \in P(x)\}\). Consider now the following generalized variational inequality problem GVI(K, G): Find \(\overline{x} \in K\) such that \(\exists h \in G(\overline{x})\) such that \(\langle h, x - \overline{x} \rangle \geq 0\), \(\forall x \in K\). In the paper, the authors provide conditions under which the solution sets of the problems M(K, P) and GVI(K, G) coincide and are nonempty. Then, they use the obtained results to get a proof of existence of equilibria in an exchange economy model.