Evolutionary game dynamics in diploid populations (Q761378)

Selection that influences behaviour can be studied using game theory if individual behavioural success depends on the frequencies of various behavioural types in the population. The evolutionarily stable strategy of \textit{J. Maynard Smith} and \textit{G. R. Price} [Nature 246, 15-18 (1973)] is an equilibrium concept like the solution of a game. The dynamic model of \textit{P. D. Taylor} and \textit{L. B. Jonker} [Math. Biosciences 40, 145-156 (1978; Zbl 0395.90118)] studied in detail by \textit{E. C. Zeeman} [see J. Theor. Biol. 89, 249-270 (1981)] goes beyond game theory using fitness to cause evolution, perhaps towards an equilibrium. A diploid version of their haploid model is considered and it is found that diploid evolution can be quite different. For example ''catastrophic'' bifurcations can occur between stable internal polymorphisms when the game matrix entries are changed slowly. A slight drop in food supply may cause extinction. Totally unfit altruistic genotypes can be maintained if they help the rest of the population. The relation of haploid game models to constant selection in diploids is also discussed.